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he active vs passive investment debate has taken a new turn recently, with reports that 
the European watchdog of securities markets – the European Securities and Markets 
Authority or ESMA – is to take a closer look at so-called ‘closet trackers’, with a view to 
identifying whether there is a potential need for a coordinated pan-European policy response. 
‘Closet trackers’ is a term used to describe fund managers who charge considerably higher 
fees than passive managers, owing to their seemingly being ‘actively managed’ in a bid to 
generate ‘alpha’, yet who achieve comparable results to passively managed funds by using 
effectively the same, low turnover investment strategy. ‘Alpha’ is a term used among financial 
markets participants to explain the ability of a fund manager to outperform a benchmark index 
through active stock selection. Investors are usually prepared to pay higher fees to skilled fund 
managers who are able to consistently beat market indices on a risk-adjusted basis and/or net 
of fees. To the extent that many fund managers are not able to do so consistently suggests that 
passive investing via exchange-traded funds (ETFs) ought to occupy a greater share of 
investment portfolios than is currently the case. Passive investing vehicles such as ETFs are 
considerably cheaper and typically display total expense ratios (TERs) between one-half to 
one-fifth of the cost of their actively managed counterparts. 
The catalyst for this regulatory development appears to be the outcome of a recent survey of 
asset managers conducted by the Danish financial services authority. The survey suggests that 
many actively managed funds in the Danish market are closet trackers, who charge high fees 
compared to ETFs but deliver little alpha, as they too closely replicate their benchmark indices. 
Consumer protection advocates, such as the Financial Services Consumer Panel and Better 
Finance have echoed similar concerns. Whilst the role of consumer advocates in the realm of 
financial markets policy is very welcome – indeed, consumer rights advocates still suffer from 
under-representation at European level – they appear to be leading regulators astray in this 
particular case. 
This is not to say that the price of financial services and products should not be an issue of 
regulatory concern. The cost of various investment vehicles, when not carefully managed, can 
over time significantly erode the net returns available to investors. Thus, focusing on the 
relative costs of different investment products is not misguided, particularly against a 
backdrop of an accelerating transition from defined benefit to defined contribution, an ageing 
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population, and the increasingly important role that private asset management will play in 
marshalling savings into long-term investments.   
Yet the path to a balanced regulatory intervention in this space is fraught with dangers, and 
could potentially do more harm than good, including from a consumer’s perspective. Two of 
these difficulties are particularly salient and immediately obvious.  
1) How to define a closet tracker?  
The first difficulty is arriving at an acceptable definition of a closet tracker. Any regulatory 
intervention in this space is meritless unless the phenomenon is clearly defined. A definition 
itself is not sufficient as a starting point to consider regulatory intervention. Such a definition 
ought to be dynamically consistent, i.e. it must be flexible enough to cater to the vagaries of 
markets and investment decisions made by active managers, and it must serve as a reliable 
gauge over time to determine which managers are engaging in undesirable practices. Yet 
defining what constitutes a ‘closet index’, whilst appearing easy in theory, becomes far more 
difficult in practice.  
Consider first how regulators could go about establishing such a definition, and the questions 
they would need to answer:  
 Is a closet tracker one that mimics a benchmark index “too much” in terms of its 
composition and weightings? 
 Is it one that replicates the performance of an index “too closely” – even though their 
compositions may differ – i.e. one whose tracking error to the index is deemed “too 
little”? 
 Is it one whose turnover is deemed “too low”, either on an absolute level, or relative to 
its benchmark? 
 Or is it all, or some, of the above? 
Further, but equally important questions include:  
 Are these thresholds subject to some kind of minimum time horizon, meaning that a 
closet tracker is one that only marginally deviates from its benchmark over a prolonged 
period of time? (try to define “prolonged”) 
 What materiality threshold would be applicable in any, or all, of these cases, i.e. how 
would “too little”, “too low” or “too much” be defined?  
Clearly, arriving at a quantitative definition of closet tracking means thresholds would have 
to be established around turnover ratios, portfolio composition and tracking error, to name 
but a few of the possible metrics that regulators would have to consider. Arriving at those 
thresholds in a non-arbitrary fashion would be exceptionally difficult, and would likely vary 
by investment strategy, meaning a very complex set of rules, which may well impact on 
portfolio managers’ behaviour in unpredictable ways. And yet rules on closet tracking that do 
not quantitatively define the practice would either have no bite or would give regulators far 
too much discretion. The latter would increase regulatory uncertainty and stifle product 
development. 
Regulatory arbitrage would inevitably ensue from a formal regulatory classification of a fund 
as a closet tracker or not. As regulatory principles are less prone to such arbitrage than detailed 
rules, they occasionally lead to better outcomes. They accordingly ought not to be forgotten in 
this debate. 
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2) Are we moving towards price regulation in asset management? 
The second major difficulty is how regulators would establish what constitutes a ‘fair price’ 
with respect to passive investing. That is, in a way, the crux of the problem. If it weren’t for 
the higher active management fees that closet trackers charge, nobody would be fussing over 
them. So the key regulatory question in this case – although many observers may be unaware 
of it – is: What is the ‘fair price’ of a passive investment? 
That formal regulatory intervention is even being considered in relation to the levels of fees 
charged by financial services providers is worrying. As an opinion on what the price of a 
passive investment ought to be, the apparent witch hunt for closet trackers amounts to nothing 
other than price regulation, for the simple reason that it suggests there ought to be a ceiling on 
the prices that investors should pay for passive investment strategies. If it were to be 
implemented in this fashion, such regulatory intervention would have nothing to do with 
regulating for transparency, consistency, or comparability of prices. It also raises difficult 
questions about how a fair price for a passive investment would be arrived at by the regulator. 
Even within the passive investing space, prices charged by providers vary markedly, and 
depend not just on competition, but on investment strategy, product structuring, distribution, 
scale, regulation and a host of other factors. 
Couched in these terms, the proposed intervention would likely be received less well by some 
of its proponents among the passive investing community. The assumption that regulators are 
better positioned than the competitive forces of the market to determine the fair price of a 
service or an investment strategy is questionable.  
3) Is a regulatory intervention really warranted? 
Regulators ought not to fall into the clever lobbying traps set by the passive industry to 
increase their market share – in what is already rapidly becoming an oligopoly, or even a 
duopoly. In order to remain impartial, it would be dishonest to suggest that passive investing 
is anything other than an absolutely critical part of the financial ecosystem. The passive 
investing industry is unambiguously one of the great and positive financial innovations of the 
past half century. It responds cheaply and effectively to the demands of a huge range of 
institutional and private investors.  
But active investing is also a critical part of the financial ecosystem, including some investment 
strategies, which may come under the fold of still-loose definitions of closet tracking. As just 
one example, closet trackers might contribute to financial stability, as ETFs are more beholden 
to short-term investor flows than actively managed funds. Rapid tactical shifts in and out of 
ETFs to benefit from market momentum, temporary tactical tilts in asset allocation, or for risk 
management purposes, can occasionally lead to more violent market gyrations – probably in 
large part because they are cheaper. In a bid to separate the wheat from the chaff, regulators 
and consumer rights advocates might inadvertently damage the fragile balance of the financial 
ecosystem. Greater financial market volatility and instability would be a high price to pay to 
shave a few tens of basis points off the annual cost of certain types of managed investment. 
From a consumer-protection perspective, investment benchmarks are useful proxies of risk. 
Indeed, they are the pillars of consumer protection regimes such as MiFID and UCITS. The 
very purpose of an ex-ante regulatory requirement for a fund/investment manager to identify 
the benchmark to which he/she is managing the portfolio is to allow the investor to make an 
informed decision on the potential risk-return characteristics of the investment. To the extent 
that closet trackers are seemingly being encouraged to deviate more from their benchmarks, 
the usefulness of the benchmark as a gauge of risk becomes less relevant or meaningful – with 
potentially detrimental results for consumers. 
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Consider, for example, the case of a country index, which is populated with defensive stocks, 
such as utilities. Depending on market conditions, an active manager might take a conscious 
bet, with a bearish view, to hug the defensive benchmark rather than taking big bets on cyclical 
stocks within or outside the index. Such benchmark hugging, in particular cases, is anything 
but detrimental to investors. On the contrary, the ability of an active manager to hug a 
benchmark as a defensive strategy, whether occasionally or even over prolonged periods of 
time, might help preserve investors’ capital.  
The phenomenon identified by the Financial Services Consumer Panel of ‘closet indexation’ 
being more prevalent in the UK and Europe than in the United States might also be due, 
paradoxically, to regulation. A very significant portion of funds registered in the EU are 
UCITS, and to the extent that UCITS impose strict diversification requirements on investment 
managers, some closet trackers may be none other than UCITS-compliant funds, which are 
prevented, by regulation, from taking the kinds of more active, concentrated bets that enhance 
tracking error. The UCITS diversification requirements are indeed a protection for consumers, 
as larger potential drawdowns may derive from aggressively deviating from a benchmark 
through highly concentrated bets. Thus, some actively managed funds, including closet 
trackers, might in practice be much better diversified than some types of passive investments, 
for example, a passive tracker fund, which aims to replicate the performance of an index 
through financial wizardry such as complicated algorithms. This suggests that rather than 
pitting closet trackers against passive funds, the quality of product structuring is probably a 
more important consideration in the ongoing debate.  
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned technical difficulties of defining what constitutes a 
closet tracker and of determining what constitutes a fair price to pay for a passive investment 
strategy, this potential regulatory intervention suggests that regulators are barking up the 
wrong tree: ESMA is far too sparsely resourced, and investor protection advocates ought to 
have far more pressing concerns, than to dedicate significant resources to a problem that pales 
in comparison to wider, unresolved, market structure and policy issues. Additionally, for the 
reasons articulated in this commentary, optimal policy design in this space would be 
exceptionally difficult, meaning that the risks are skewed towards a poorly designed 
intervention. 
Regulation can lead to improved consumer outcomes, but only under certain conditions. These 
conditions are namely: i) it responds to a clear market failure; ii) it identifies and deploys the 
most appropriate/effective instrument to address the market failure; and iii) the response is 
proportionate to the failure and doesn’t go beyond the minimum intervention required, so as 
not to destabilise the animal spirits of the free economy, particularly competitive forces 
conducive to creative destruction. It is not immediately apparent that a market failure exists 
in relation to closet trackers, nor that regulatory interventions of the kind suggested would 
lead to improved outcomes for consumers. The best regulatory tools to tackle this perceived 
problem are transparency and competition. These tools are already available to regulators 
through a range of product design, disclosure, suitability and conflicts of interest management 
embedded in EU legislative measures, particularly MiFID and UCITS, which form the core of 
investor protection in relation to the European asset management industry. 
In the past, interventions made in the name of investor protection have occasionally led to 
worse outcomes for investors. And sometimes, just sometimes, the best course of policy action 
has been inaction. May this lesson not be lost during the exercise regulators are currently 
undertaking on closet trackers. 
